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Bankruptcy
by W. Homer Drake, Jr.*
and
Michael M. Duclos*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit decided twenty-three cases in the area of bankruptcy law. These
decisions covered a wide variety of issues arising under the Bankruptcy
Code,1 as well as several issues concerning nonbankruptcy law. This
Article is a survey of the bankruptcy decisions rendered by the Eleventh
Circuit in 1996.
IL

A.

MUNFORD AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LEVERAGED BUYOUT

Settlement of Potential Claims

The Eleventh Circuit issued three significant decisions in the Munford
bankruptcy case. There, the debtor operated convenience and specialty
stores and filed for bankruptcy shortly after being purchased through a
leveraged buyout ("LBO") transaction. The first Munford decision 2
concerned a bankruptcy court's authority to enjoin contribution and
indemnification claims among nondebtor parties. The debtor commenced
an adversary proceeding against various shareholders, former officers
and directors, and Valuation Research Corporation ("VRC") in an
attempt to recover damages resulting from the failed LBO. VRC offered
to settle the claim, but only if the bankruptcy court issued an order
* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Georgia. Mercer University
(B., 1954; L.L.B. 1956). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate with the law firm of Fortson, Bentley and Griffin, Athens, Georgia. Emory
University (BA, 1989); University of Georgia (J.D., 1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended in 11 U.S.C. and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. Munford v. Munford, Inc. (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 1996).
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enjoining the other nonsettling defendants from asserting claims for
contribution and indemnification against VRC. The debtor accepted the
offer, and the bankruptcy court issued the order.' The other defendants
appealed, but the district court affirmed.'
On further appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, defendants first argued
that the bankruptcy court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
their state law contribution claims that had not been asserted in the
adversary proceedings.' However, the Eleventh Circuit found that
without the order enjoining the contribution claims, the debtor would
have lost its option to settle the claim with VRC. As a result, a
sufficient nexus existed between the dispute and the bankruptcy case,
thereby giving the bankruptcy court subject matter jurisdiction.'
In their next argument, the nonsettling defendants contended that the
bankruptcy court lacked the legal authority to enjoin their claim.8
However, the Eleventh Circuit found the necessary legal authority in
section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code9 and rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.' ° Under section 105, a bankruptcy court "may issue
any order... that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of this title."" Under rule 16, a bankruptcy court has the authority to
take any appropriate action with respect to settlements. 12 The combination of these two provisions provided the bankruptcy court with ample
authority to enter an order barring the enforcement of the contribution
claims.' 3
B. Liability for the FailedLBO
The second Munford decision"' involved the liability of the debtor's
corporate directors under state law for the LBO that led to Munford's
demise.'" The bankruptcy and district courts concluded that Georgia's

3.

97 F.3d at 452; see In re Munford, 172 B.R. 404 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).

4. 97 F.3d at 452.
5. Id. at 453.
6. Id. at 453-54.
7. Id. (citing Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 787-88
(11th Cir. 1990)).
8. Id. at 452.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994), cited in 97 F.3d at 454.
10. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 cited in 97 F.3d at 454. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply to bankruptcy adversary proceedings. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7016.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
12. FED. R. Cirv. P. 16(cX9).
13. 97 F.3d at 455.
14. Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 456 (11th Cir.
1996).
15. Id. at 458.
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stock distribution and repurchase statutes applied to a leveraged
acquisition of a corporation."6 At the time of the LBO, section 14-2-91
of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") provided that
corporate directors may distribute to shareholders surplus capital, but
no such distribution is to be made if the corporation is insolvent or
would be rendered so by the distribution. 7 In addition, O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-92 prohibited directors of a corporation from authorizing the
corporation to repurchase its own shares if doing so would render the
corporation insolvent.18 Finally, under O.C.G.A. section 14-2-154,
directors who acted in violation of these statutes were jointly and
severally liable for the amounts involved.' The directors argued that
the statutes were inapplicable to an LBO because in an LBO transaction
the control of the corporation changes hands."0 This argument did not
persuade the Eleventh Circuit. The court found instead that the LBO
transaction was a "paper merger" of the debtor and a shell corporation
with no assets."' To allow the directors to escape state law liability
under these circumstances "would frustrate the restrictions imposed
upon directors who authorize a corporation to distribute its assets or to
repurchase its shares from stockholders when such transactions would
render the corporation insolvent. 2 Thus, the court held that an LBO
was subject to Georgia's stock distribution and repurchase statutes.'
In the final Munford decision, 4 the court discussed the liability of
various other parties as a result of the LBO and resulting bankruptcy. 5 The debtor sought to recover as fraudulent transfers the payments the two largest shareholders received for their shares in the
LBO.26 Both the bankruptcy and district courts concluded that such
payments were "settlement payments," and in accordance with section
546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code,27 not subject to recovery by the debt-

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 460.
O.C.GA. § 14-2-91(a)(1) (1982) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 14-2-640(c) (1994)).
Id. § 14-2-92(e) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 14-2-640(c) (1994)).
Id. § 14-2-154(aX1) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 14-2-832(a) (1994)).
97 F.3d at 459.
Id. at 460.

22. Id
23. Id. It is worth pointing out that in reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to follow a decision of the Fourth Circuit which concluded otherwise. Id.at 459-60
(citing C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett, 958 F.2d 606, 611 (4th Cir. 1992)).
24. Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604 (11th Cir.
1996) (per curiam).
25. Id. at 608.
26. Id. at 607.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (1994).
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or.2" Section 546(e) provides that "the [debtor-in-possession] may not
avoid a transfer that is... a settlement payment... made by or to a
commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial
institution, or securities clearing agency."'
The term "settlement
payment" refers to various types of payments "commonly used in
securities trade."' Disagreeing with the lower courts, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the payments in question were not protected
under section 546(e) because the shareholders received the payments
from the debtor."' In order for section 546(e) to shield a transfer, the
payment must be made to the shareholder from one of the entities listed
in that section.32 As a result, the shareholders could face liability on
the debtor's fraudulent transfer claim.'
The next issue discussed involved the debtor's tort claims against its
officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, misman35
agement, and waste of corporate assets.' Looking to Georgia law,
the Eleventh Circuit stated that under the "business judgment rule,"
officers and directors are protected from liability "when they make good
faith business decisions in an informed and deliberate manner."' The
undisputed evidence was that the officers and directors of Munford
consulted legal and financial experts throughout the LBO process and
that by doing so, they satisfied their state law duty." Therefore, the
officers and directors escaped liability on the debtor's tort claim.
Likewise, the financial adviser, Shearson Lehman Brothers, escaped
liability when the court refused to recognize a state law claim for "aiding
and abetting" a breach of fiduciary duty.
In another claim, the debtor argued that severance contracts Munford
entered into with three of its top officers were fraudulent transfers
because the agreements lacked consideration.39 Under the agreement,
the officers promised to continue in Munford's employment until the

28. 98 F.3d at 609.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
30.

11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (1994).

31. 98 F.3d at 610.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-152.1(a)(1) repealed by 1988 GA. LAWS 1070 (current version
codified at O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 (1994)) (requiring officers and directors of corporation to
discharge duties in good faith and with the care of an ordinary prudent person).
36. 98 F.3d at 611 (citing Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570,575 (11th
Cir. 1988)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 612-13.
39. Id. at 608.
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closing of the sale of Munford.' The Eleventh Circuit'found that under
Georgia law, continued employment in a terminable-at-will employment
situation constituted consideration.4 ' Also, had the officers terminated
their employment and frustrated Munford's plan to sell its stock, the
severance contract would have provided Munford with recourse against
the officers. 42
III.

A.

CONTEMPT POWER OVER THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Violation of the Automatic Stay

The liability of the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") for violating the
automatic stay was the heart of the issue in Jove Engineering,Inc. v.
Internal Revenue Service.43 After the debtor, Jove Engineering, filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, the I.R.S. made repeated attempts to
force payment of prepetition taxes in violation of the automatic stay."
Eventually, Jove Engineering filed a motion with the bankruptcy court
to hold the I.R.S. in civil contempt.45 The district court found that all
the violations committed by the I.R.S. were merely inadvertent, as
compared to intentional and malicious, and only awarded Jove Engineering five hundred dollars for attorney fees.46
Jove Engineering appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit,
contesting the limited recovery4 7 Specifically, the debtor claimed that
section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code" provided a source for the relief
However, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that section
it sought.4
362(h) did not authorize an award of damages in this case.' Section
362(h) grants relief to "[anindividual injured by any willful violation"
of the automatic stay.5 Under the plain meaning of this provision,

40. Id. at 606.
41. Id. at 612 (citing Royal Crown Cos. v. McMahon, 183 Ga. App. 543,545,359 S.E.2d
379, 381 (1987)).
42. Id.
43. 92 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1996).
44. Id. at 1543-44. The provisions of the automatic stay are found at 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1994).
45. 92 F.3d at 1544.
46. Id. at 1545.
47. Id.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).
49. 92 F.3d at 1549.
50. Id.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (emphasis added).
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Jove Engineering was not entitled to relief because it was a corporation,
not an individual.52
The Eleventh Circuit then considered Jove Engineering's alternative
argument that section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code" authorized finding
the I.R.S. in contempt for violating the automatic stay." Under section
105, a court has broad powers to issue "any" type of order that is
"necessary or appropriate" to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. 6 The use of the broad term "any" led the Eleventh Circuit to
conclude that section 105 included orders awarding monetary relief.5"
Furthermore, the court found that an award for monetary relief was
"necessary or appropriate" for certain violations of the automatic stay."
As a result, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that section 105 allowed Jove
Engineering to seek an order granting monetary relief for the I.R.S.'s
repeated violations of the automatic stay."
The Eleventh Circuit further found that the I.R.S.'s violations were
willful."9 A violation is "willful" if the I.R.S. (1) knew that the automatic stay was in place and (2) intended the actions that violated the
stay.s Under the undisputed facts of the case, the I.R.S. was notified
several times of the pending bankruptcy, but it nevertheless intentionally took actions that violated the automatic stay.' In other words, the
fact that the I.R.S. did not intend to violate the automatic stay did not

52. 92 F.3d at 1550. This conclusion is in accord with decisions by the Second and
Ninth Circuits. See Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 619
(9th Cir. 1993); Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 920 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1990). The Third and Fourth Circuits have ruled to the
contrary. See Cuffee v. Atlantic Business and Community Dev. Corp. (In re Atlantic
Business & Community Corp.), 901 F.2d 325,329 (3d Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better
Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 105.
54. 92 F.3d at 1553.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
56. 92 F.3d at 1554.
57. Id.
58. Id. This conclusion is interesting because, according to this view, any party,
including a corporation, may be entitled to seek damages for a violation of the automatic
stay under section 105. Thus, the intent of Congress, as the Eleventh Circuit found to exist
in section 362(h), that only indiuiduals be entitled to such relief is rendered a virtual
nullity. Perhaps the only distinction that remains is that the provisions authorizing
damages under section 362(h) are mandatory while the provisions of section 105 are merely
permissive.
59. 92 F.3d at 1555.
60. ld
61. Id. at 1555-56.
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relieve it of liability, because it intended to take the actions which
resulted in a violation."
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit determined that, as a result of its
violation of the automatic stay, the I.R.S. could be subject to civil
contempt but that only coercive, not punitive, sanctions could be
imposed.' Sanctions are coercive "if they serve the complainant rather
However, Jove Engineering
than vindicate some public interest.'
sought "severe monetary damages in the form of a fixed non-compensatory fine," which the court found to be punitive in nature and thus not
allowable."' Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Jove
Engineering could be entitled to attorney fees and remanded the case to
the district court for further consideration.6
B. Vilation of the Discharge Injunction
In Hardy v. United States (In re Hardy),"7 the Internal Revenue
Service again found itself in hot water, this time for violating the
The
discharge injunction of section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code.'
debtor, Pierce Lamar Hardy, reopened his Chapter 13 bankruptcy case
in 1993 and filed an adversary proceeding against the government,
claiming that the I.R.S. violated the discharge injunction of section 524
by trying to collect discharged tax debts.6 9 The lower courts dismissed
the proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after concluding
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the imposition of

62. Interestingly, the I.R.S. tried to excuse its repeated violations of the stay by
blaming its computer system. The Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded by such an
argument, stating that the I.R.S. could not shift the burden of a faulty or inadequate
computer system to the debtor. Id. at 1556. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit found
inadequate a letter from the I.R.S. to Jove Engineering stating that it may "inadvertently"
levy and seize property in violation of the automatic stay and that the debtor should report
such actions to the I.R.S. instead of filing a motion for contempt in the bankruptcy court.
Id. at 1557. The court stated that such an "attempt to burden debtors with policing [the]
I.R.S.'s misconduct is in complete derogation of the law" that each party is responsible for
ensuring its compliance with a court order. Id.
63. Id. at 1557-60.
64. Id. at 1558.
65, Id at 1559.
66. Id. at 1559-60.
67. 97 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1996).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 524. This provision states in pertinent part that a discharge in
bankruptcy "[o]perates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an
action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover, or offset any such debt as
a personal liability of the debtor." Id.
69. 97 F.3d at 1387.
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monetary damages against the government.7" Hardy appealed further
to the Eleventh Circuit.7 During the pendency of the appeal, President
Clinton signed into law the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,72 which
amended section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code, the provision discussing
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy."
Thereafter, section 106, as
amended, specifically abrogated the government's sovereign immunity
for claims arising under section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code.74
When the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision, it concluded that by
virtue of the 1994 amendments, sovereign immunity had been waived
with respect to Hardy's claim, which gave the lower courts subject
matter jurisdiction.75 However, Hardy had to demonstrate that a
source outside of section 106 entitled him to the monetary relief
sought .7 6 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the trend among courts was
to find that bankruptcy courts had the inherent contempt power under
section 524 to grant the necessary relief for violations of the discharge
injunction. 77 Nevertheless, instead of finding such inherent power, the
Eleventh Circuit decided to exercise caution and rely on the statutory
contempt powers of section 105."s Relying on its recent decision in Jove
Engineering, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service,7 the court in Hardy
concluded that section 105 granted bankruptcy courts the power to
award monetary damages for violations of the discharge injunction of
section 524.80
IV.

CHAPTER 13 ELIGIBILITY

The Eleventh Circuit issued a significant decision on the question of
determining Chapter 13 eligibility in United States v. Verdunn.s' The

70. Id.; see also Hardy v. United States (In re Hardy), 161 B.R. 320 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1993), affd, 171 B.R. 912 (S.D. Ga. 1994), reu'd, 97 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1996).
71. 97 F.3d at 1387.
72. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
73. 1&
74. 97 F.3d at 1387-88. After the 1994 amendment, section 106 contained a subsection
expressly abrogating sovereign immunity as to a governmental unit for sixty specific
sections of the Bankruptcy Code, including sections 106 and 362. 11 U.S.C. § 106(aXl)
(1994).
75. 97 F.3d at 1388.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1389.
78. Id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (warning that courts
must exercise caution in invoking inherent powers)).
79. 92 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1996). For further discussion of Jove, see supra notes 43-66
and accompanying text.
80. 97 F.3d at 1389-90.
81. 89 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 1996).
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I.R.S. issued Thomas Verdunn a notice of tax deficiency of $297,000 for
the years from 1982 to 1986.82 The notice of deficiency specified the
amount of the tax liability based on criteria established by the Internal
Revenue Code." Verdunn challenged the deficiency determination in
Tax Court, but he filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition shortly before
the Tax Court was to conduct a trial on the matter."
The I.R.S. fied a proof of claim in Verdunn's case for $297,000 in
unsecured debt and then objected to confirmation of Verdunn's plan,
contending that he was not entitled to Chapter 13 eligibility."5 Under
section 109(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, "[o]nly an individual with regular
income that owes, on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent,
liquidated,unsecured debts of less than $100,000" is eligible for Chapter
13 relief." Because Verdunn disputed the character and nature of his
tax liability, the bankruptcy court concluded that the I.R.S.'s claim was
not "liquidated" for purposes of section 109(e). 7 The district court
affirmed, also holding that because Verdunn "vigorously disputed" his
tax liability, the debt was not "readily ascertainable" and, as such, not
liquidated.88
The I.R.S. further appealed its case to the Eleventh Circuit, which
focused its discussion on whether the tax claim was a liquidated one."
The court defined a liquidated debt
as one where it is certain what is due and how much is due. A
liquidated debt is that which has been made certain as to amount due
by agreement of the parties or by operation of law. Therefore, the
concept of a liquidated debt relates to the amount of liability, not the
existence of liability.'
Verdunn argued that the amount of the debt was not readily ascertainable by the deficiency notice."' He also contended that the fraud

82. Id. at 800.
83. Id. at 803. The deficiency determinations are based on criteria found at 26 U.S.C.

§ 6211(a).
84. 89 F.3d at 800.
85. Id.

86. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988) (emphasis added). The $100,000 unsecured debt limit was
in existence at the time Verdunn filed his bankruptcy petition. By virtue of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, the debt limit for unsecured debt is now $250,000. See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
87. 89 F.3d at 801.
88. Id. at 801-02; see also United States v. Verdunn, 187 B.R. 996 (M.D. Fla, 1995).

89. 89 F.3d at 802.
90. Id. (footnote and citations omitted) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (6th ed.
1990) and In re McGovern, 122 B.R. 712, 715 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989)).
91. Id. at 801.
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allegations were disputed and that an extensive evidentiary hearing in
the Tax Court was necessary to determine the liability." In contrast,
the I.R.S. argued the debt was liquidated because the notice of deficiency
provided the necessary information to compute the tax liability in
accordance with tax law.9 In support of its argument, the I.R.S. cited
the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re Knight." In that case, the
debtor was a town court judge required under state law to report traffic
convictions to the state bureau of motor vehicles.95 Under state law,
the failure to report a conviction resulted in a fine of one hundred
dollars." The debtor failed to report 915 convictions, resulting in a
liability of $91,500."' In bankruptcy, the debtor argued that this debt
was not liquidated because he disputed his liability." The Seventh
Circuit disagreed and found that the debt was liquidated because the
amount was fixed in a demand letter sent by the state to the debtor and
could be calculated under the relevant state statute."
The Eleventh Circuit found the I.R.S.'s argument persuasive,
particularly its reliance on Knight; in fact, the court concluded that
Verdunn was indistinguishable from Knight.' Internal Revenue Code
standards were used to calculate Verdunn's tax liability. 0 ' The
amount of the liability was evident from the statutory notice of
deficiency.10 As in Knight, the debt was readily ascertainable and
therefore liquidated for purposes of section 109(e)."03 Also, the debtor's
dispute of the claim did not render the debt unliquidated.' ° Therefore, Verdunn was not eligible for Chapter 13 relief.
V. THE AUTOMATIC STAY
In United States v. Ruff (In re Rush-Hampton Industries), 5 the
Eleventh Circuit essentially ruled "no harm, no foul" in finding that the

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
.97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 802.
Id.
55 F.3d 231 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id. at 235.
89 F.3d at 803.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 802 n.9 (citing In re Knight, 55 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Jordan,

166 B.R. 201, 202 (Bankr. D. Me. 1994); Vaughan v. Central Bank of the South (In re
Vaughan), 36 B.R. 935, 938 (N.D. Ala.), affd, 741 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1984)).
105. 98 F.3d 614 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Internal Revenue Service was entitled to postpetition interest despite its
The I.R.S. filed a claim in the
violation of the automatic stay.'
debtor's bankruptcy case for unpaid 1978 taxes plus interest. 7 Later,
the I.R.S. determined that the debtor had overpaid its 1979 taxes, and
it set off the claim for the 1978 taxes against the 1979 overpayment
without seeking relief from the automatic stay."~ The bankruptcy
court held that the I.R.S. violated the automatic stay, but nevertheless
allowed the 1979 overpayment to cover the 1978 taxes.1°9 However,
the bankruptcy court decided to penalize the I.R.S. for the violation by
denying it the right to receive postpetition interest on its claim, and the
district court affirmed. 0
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the lower courts that the I.R.S.
should have first obtained relief from the automatic stay before
But even though a violation of the
exercising its right of setoff.'
automatic stay would require damages if a debtor is injured" 2 the
Eleventh Circuit found no authority for the bankruptcy court to deny the
I.R.S.'s right to postpetition interest in lieu of damages, particularly
because the trustee in the case did not seek damages."' In short, the
Eleventh Circuit found that under the "narrow" circumstances of the
case, the conduct of the I.R.S. was a mere "harmless violation of the
automatic stay"4that did not justify the sanction that the bankruptcy
court imposed."

VI.

REJECTION OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS

A creditor challenged a debtor's ability to reject a homesite purchase
contract in Sipes v. Atlantic Gulf Communities Corp. (In re General

Development Corp.)."' Both the bankruptcy and district courts
concluded that the contract was executory for the purpose of section
365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, thus allowing the debtor to reject

106. Id. at 617.
107. Id. at 615.

108. Id.
109. Id. (citingln re Rush-Hampton Indus., 159 B.R. 343,347 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993)).

110. Id.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 616.
11 U.S.C. § 362(h).
98 F.3d at 616.
Id. at 617.
84 F.3d 1364 (llth Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994).
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it."7 The creditor appealed further to the Eleventh Circuit, which
affirmed by adopting the opinion of the district court. 18
The Sipes and General Development Corporation entered into an
agreement for the sale of a homesite in Florida. In 1990, General
Development entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Once in bankruptcy,
General Development rejected its homesite purchase contract with the
Sipes. The Sipes, however, argued that the homesite purchase
agreement was not an executory contract that could be rejected in
bankruptcy" 9 Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a
Chapter 11 debtor to "assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor."'2 0 Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Code
does not provide a definition for the term "executory contract." The
Sipes argued that a contract was executory if "there remained mutual
obligations due and owing from the parties."' Under this definition,
the homesite purchase agreement would not be executory because the
Sipes had fulfilled all their obligations.
The court, however, did not agree with the Sipes' definition.
Instead, it followed a "functional approach" by which a contract is
executory if the rejection would ultimately benefit the bankruptcy estate
and creditors." Under this view, the contract would be executory if
only the debtor had outstanding obligations under it, and the obligations
were a burden to the debtor. This was the case with General Development. The homesite purchase agreement obligated it to improve and
deed developed homesites, and its ability to reject these obligations
because it did not have the financial ability to perform them was critical
to the reorganization. 24 Therefore, General Development's rejection
of the homesite purchase agreement was proper, and the Sipes no longer
had an enforceable interest under the agreement. 22

117. 84 F.3d at 1365, affg 177 B.R. 1000, 1002 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
118. 84 F.3d at 1365.
119. Id. at 1366.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994). The Bankruptcy Code does not define "executory
contract."
121. 84 F.3d at 1374.
122. Id.

123. Id. at 1375 (citing Arrow Air v. Port Auth. (In re Arrow Air, Inc.), 60 B.R. 117, 12122 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986)).
124. Id. at 1374.
125, Id. at 1375.
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VII. PRIORITY OF CLAIMS
In the Chapter 7 case of Internal Revenue Service v. Davis (In re
Davis),'26 the Eleventh Circuit decided that an I.R.S. claim for taxes
under section 507(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code' 7 should be paid as a
priority claim under section 726(a)(1)"2 even though the I.R.S. did not
file the claim within the time required under Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)."m The bankruptcy court had held that the tax claim could only be
paid as an unsecured claim under section 726(aX3)' s because of its
" ' The district court held otherwise, concluding that
untimeliness.18
timeliness provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) do not apply to
distributions under section 726(a)(1).l32 Noting that the statutory
language of section 726(a)(1) makes no distinction between late and
timely claims, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's
application of the law and affirmed. 1"
VIII.

EXEMPTIONS

Georgia Homestead Exemption
The Eleventh Circuit discussed a debtor's ability to avoid a lien on
exempt property in Holloway v. John Hancock Mutual Life InsuranceCo.
When Linda and Eldridge Holloway fied for
(In re Holloway)."
bankruptcy, they included with their petition a list of exempt property.

A.

126. 81 F.3d 134 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 507(aX7) (1993). Under the Bankruptcy Code as amended in 1994, the
provision governing the priority of tax claims is now at 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 726(aXl) (1994). This statute provides that section 507 claims are to
be paid first during the distribution of estate property in a Chapter 7 case. Id. This
provision, as amended in 1994, now requires that proofs of such claims must be filed timely
or, if tardily filed, then before the date the trustee begins the distribution of estate
property. Id.
129. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c). Under this rule, claims generally must be filed within
90 days after the date first set for the meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(3).
131. 81 F.3d at 135.
132. Id.
133. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit followed the decisions of the
Ninth and Second Circuits. See United States v. Towers (In re Pacific Atlantic Trading
Co.), 33 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1994), superceded by statute as stated in In re Thomas
Bros. Restaurant Corp. One, 195 B.R. 918, 921 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(bX9), specifically, and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, generally, as being the
statutes that superceded the case); United States v. Vecchio (In re Vecchio), 20 F.3d 555,
557 (2d Cir. 1994).
134. 81 F.3d 1062 (1996).
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Included on thatlist was their residence, but the Holloways listed the
value of the exemption as zero." Once in bankruptcy, the Holloways
filed a motion to avoid a lien on their residence pursuant to section
522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code,' the lien being the result of a judgment obtained by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company."3 7
The specific issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether a debtor
needed to have equity in the property to claim an exemption and avoid
the lien. As already noted, the Holloways listed the value of their
exemption as zero, and they had no equity in the property because it was
subject to two security deeds and a tax lien in addition to the judgment
lien.18 Section 522(f) of the bankruptcy Code allows avoidance of a
judgment lien "on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that
such lien impairs an exemption. " '39 According to the Eleventh Circuit,
the outcome of the case turned on the definition of the phrase "impairs
an exemption. " ' The court noted divergent lines of cases. One line
concludes that, under the plain language of the statute, section 522(f)
allows avoidance of a judicial lien only to the extent it impairs the
exemption." Thus, if the claimed exemption was invalid, the debtor
could not avoid the judgment lien. The contrary line of cases concludes
that liens are avoidable even if the debtor can claim no equity in the
property.142 The court in Holloway noted, however, that it was bound
to follow the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in the case of Wrenn v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn)," whereby the court held
that under the plain language of section 522(f), a debtor can avoid a lien
only to the extent it impairs the exemption, irrespective of the debtor's
equity interest in the property.'" In view of Wrenn, the court concluded that the Holloways could avoid John Hancock's lien only to the extent
it impaired their homestead exemption."" Because the Holloways

135. 81 F.3d at 1064.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994). This Code section provides in relevant part that "the
debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent
that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under
subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is... a judicial lien." 11 U.S.C. § 522(1)(A).
137. 81 F.3d at 1065.
138. Id. at 1064.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 522(fYX).
140. 81 F.3d at 1068.
141. Id. at 1068 (citing Riddell v. N.C.R. Universal Credit Union (In re Riddell), 96 B.R.
816 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989)).
142. Id. at 1068.69. See, e.g., In re Magosin, 75 B.R. 545 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
143. 40 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 1994).
144. Id. at 1166-67. Section 522(b) was amended in 1994 to overrule the result reached
by Wrenn. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
145. 81 F.3d at 1069.
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valued their exemption at zero, John Hancock's lien could not be
avoided."
B. Florida Homestead Exemption
Yet another homestead exemption claim was at issue when the
Eleventh Circuit decided Englander v. Mills (In re Englander).47
Upon filing bankruptcy, the debtors claimed a homestead exemption in
1.05 acres of lakefront property within a municipality."4 Under the
Florida constitution, however, a debtor is entitled to a homestead
exemption only to one-half acre of land if located within a municipality.149 The trustee and creditors objected to the claimed exemption
because it exceeded this size limitation."5 In response to the objection,
the debtors clarified their exemption by designating a portion of their
property as nonexempt and subject to sale for the benefit of creditors. 151 However, this nonexempt portion had no access to roads,
utilities, or lake frontage, and it was completely surrounded by property
claimed as exempt. 5 " The bankruptcy court concluded that the
debtors' "gerrymandering" of their homestead exemption was in bad faith
and denied the exemption."5 As a result, the bankruptcy court
ordered the whole property sold and allocated the proceeds to satisfy the
The district court afdebtors' right to a homestead exemption.'
firmed. 5 ' Because the debtors' property was indivisible, thereby
making a sale of the nonexempt portion impossible, the Eleventh Circuit
found the equitable solution to be a sale of the property and to apportion
the proceeds as an "appropriate recognition of the debtors' homestead
exemption."'" Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed." 7
FloridaAnnuities Exemption
Whether a settlement agreement was an annuity contract for the
purposes of an exemption under Florida law was the issue in Guardian
C.

146. L&
147.

95 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996).

148. Id at 1029.
149.
150.
151.

FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(aX1).
95 F.3d at 1029.
Id. at 1029-30.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1030.
Id. (citing In re Englander, 156 B.R. 862, 864 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)).
95 F.3d at 1030.
Id.
Id. at 1032.

157.

Id&
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Life Insurance Co. v. Solomon (In re Solomon)."5 The debtor, Fred
Solomon, settled a claim in 1985 against Union Mutual Life Insurance
Company. 59 Under the settlement agreement, Union Mutual was to pay
Solomon $50,000, followed by monthly payments of $6,507.97 for ten
years, and finally a lump-sum payment of $450,000.'60 When Solomon
filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 1993, he listed the settlement
proceeds as exempt property, claiming that the settlement agreement
was an annuity contract.'
Under Florida law, proceeds of annuity
contracts are exempt. 62 Before the Eleventh Circuit, Guardian Life
argued that the settlement agreement between Solomon and Union
Mutual was not exempt because it was not an annuity contract and that
neither party intended it to be one."e In contrast, Solomon argued for
a broad definition of "annuity contracts" that would encompass the
settlement agreement in question.'"
The Eleventh Circuit, agreeing with Guardian Life, concluded that the
settlement agreement was not an annuity contract under Florida
law.6
Specifically, the court in Solomon read Florida case law "to
require the existence of an actual annuity contract before a series of
payments may be exempt."'
Solomon's receipt of a series of payments from Union Mutual did not in itself create an annuity contract.,1 7 Instead, the court noted that "[tlo qualify for the exemption,
the parties to the agreement must have intended to create an annuity
contract."' 68 Nothing in the settlement agreement between Solomon
and Union Mutual revealed that they intended the settlement to create
an annuity contract.' 9 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that
170
Solomon was not entitled to the exemption.

158. 95 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 1996).
159. Id. at 1077.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.14 (West 1993).
163. 95 F.3d at 1078.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 1079.
168. Id. See In re Conner, 172 B.R. 119, 121 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Dillon, 166
B.R. 766, 769 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
169. 95 F.3d at 1079.
170. Id.
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EXCEPTIONS TO DISCHARGE

A.

Debts for Fraud
A debtor who did not directly obtain the benefit of his fraudulent
conduct nevertheless found his debt for fraud excepted from discharge
7
in HSSM #7 Ltd. Partnershipv. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian).1
' HSSM
obtained a judgment in a federal district court in Texas against Paul
Bilzerian and his corporation, Bicoastal Financial Corporation, after a
jury found that Bilzerian fraudulently induced HSSM to invest monies
in Bicoastal.'72 After Bilzerian filed for bankruptcy, HSSM commenced
an adversary proceeding, objecting under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code 17 3 to the discharge of this judgment debt. 4 Under
section 523(a)(2)(A), a bankruptcy discharge "does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt.., for money, property, services, or an
extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by
false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud."7 6
On motions for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court ruled in
favor of Bilzerian and found that Bicoastal Financial Corporation, not
Bilzerian, directly received the benefit of the fraudulent conduct. 7 "
However, the district court reversed, concluding that Bilzerian received
some benefit, at least indirectly, from the fraud. 177 The district court
further concluded that under the principles of collateral estoppel, the
Texas judgment established the necessary elements of fraud, thereby
resulting in the debt in question being excepted from discharge pursuant
to section 523(a)(2)(A). 178
On Bilzerian's appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered the issue of
whether a debtor must receive a benefit from fraud in order for a debt
to be subject to the discharge exception of section 523(a)(2)(A). 79 As
to this question, three views have emerged. The first view, and the one
adopted by the bankruptcy court, is that the debtor must personally

171. 100 F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 1996).
172. Id. at 888.
173. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2XA) (1994).
174. 100 F.3d at 888.
175. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2)(A).
176. 100 F.3d at 889. See HSSM #7 Ltd. Partnership v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 162
B.R. 583 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
177. 100 F.3d at 889.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 889-91.
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receive the money that was obtained by fraud. I
The second view,
called the "receipt of benefits theory" and adopted by the district court,
is that the debtor need only derive some benefit from the fraud. The
third and most liberal view is that the debtor need only obtain money by
fraudulent means, but the debtor need not personally receive the money
or any benefit therefrom.'
Although lower court opinions on this issue were varied, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had adopted the
receipt of benefits theory."' Most analogous was the Ninth Circuit
case of In re Ashley, which involved a debtor who fraudulently induced
a creditor to loan money to his corporation.'"'. The Ninth Circuit found
that the debtor was in a position to benefit from the infusion of capital
to his corporation, resulting in the debt being excepted from dis1
charge.
The Eleventh Circuit found the reasoning of Ashley persuasive and
concluded that Bilzerian, by fraudulently inducing HSSM to invest in his
corporation, was in a position to receive a benefit from his fraud.' As
a result of the benefit he received, Bilzerian's debt to HSSM was
excepted from discharge even though he did not personally receive the
money from HSSM.'87 The Eleventh Circuit then concluded that
Bilzerian was precluded from contesting the fraud finding of the Texas
court under principles of collateral estoppel.'
Thus, the debt to
HSSM was excepted from Bilzerian's bankruptcy discharge.'
The issue before the Eleventh Circuit in Fuller v. Johannessen(In re
Johannessen) was whether the allegations in the complaint were
sufficient to state a claim for fraud, thereby excepting the fraudulently
acquired debt from discharge."s The creditors in that case settled a
claim against the debtor arising from the construction of a house.'9 '
After reaching the settlement, however, the debtor filed for Chapter 7

180. Id. at 890.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. See BancBoston Mortgage Corp. v. Ledford (In re Ledford), 970 F.2d 1556 (6th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 916 (1993); Luce v. First Equip. Leasing Corp. (In re
Luce), 960 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1992); Ashley v. Church (In re Ashley), 903 F.2d 599 (9th
Cir. 1990).
184. Ashley, 903 F.2d at 602.
185. Id. at 604.
186. 100 F.3d at 891.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 892.
189. Id.
190. 76 F.3d 347 (11th Cir. 1996).
191. Id. at 348.
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The creditors filed a complaint to determine the
bankruptcy."s
dischargeability of the debt, claiming that the debt arising from the
settlement was excepted from discharge for fraud under section
On the debtor's motion to dismiss,'94 the bankruptcy
523(a)(2)(A)."a
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and the district court
affirmed."
On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated the rule that "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." "' Also, under
the Federal Rules, a plaintiff need only set forth a short and plain
statement of his claim to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim
is.197 Additionally, on a motion to dismiss, a court is required to accept
as true the allegations contained in the complaint.s'
The court in Johannessen found a statement in the creditors'
complaint alleging that the debtor made misrepresentations about the
monies that were being delivered to him.'" Next, the creditors alleged
that they relied on the misrepresentations and that their reliance was
Finally, the creditors claimed
justified under the circumstances.2'
monetary damages as a result of the misrepresentations.2"' These
allegations were sufficient to state a claim for fraud under section
523(a)(2)(A). 202 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower courts
and remanded the case to proceed on the merits.2 '

192. 1d.
193. Id. at 349. Under section 523(a)(2XA), a bankruptcy discharge does not discharge
a debtor from any debt to the extent obtained by "false pretenses, a false representation,
or actual fraud." 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XA).
194. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 12(bX6) (applicable to bankruptcy under FED. R. BANKR. P.
7012).
195. 76 F.3d at 348. See also Fuller v. Johannessen, 180 B.R. 682 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
196. 76 F.3d at 349 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
197. Id. at 349-50. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
198. Id. at 350.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. Perhaps anticipating a defense to be asserted by the debtor, the Eleventh
Circuit further noted that the fact that the debt in question was the result of a settlement
agreement did not prevent it from being a debt for fraud. Id. See Greenberg v. Schools,
711 F.2d 152, 156 (11th Cir. 1983).
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B. Debts for Alimony, Maintenance, or Support
The Eleventh Circuit considered the dischargeability of attorney fees
in a child support dispute in Strickland v. Shannon (In re Strickland).'°4 Kenneth Strickland petitioned a Florida court to modify a
child support order.205 The state court denied the petition and ordered
Kenneth to pay $9430.50 in attorney fees and costs to his former wife,
Lauren. 20' After filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, Kenneth
commenced an adversary proceeding to determine whether the debt for
attorney fees and costs were excepted from his discharge under section
523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.20 7 The bankruptcy court ruled as a
matter of law that a debt for attorney fees in a postdivorce child custody
dispute is discharged in bankruptcy. 2w The district court reversed,
however, and Kenneth appealed further.2 °
The Eleventh Circuit stated that the issue of whether a debt was in
the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support was a matter of federal
law and not state law.210 Nevertheless, state law can provide guidance
in making the determination.2 1' Under Florida law, a former spouse's
relative need and ability to pay serves as the basis for awarding attorney
fees in a modification action. 2 Therefore, in this case, the state court
necessarily determined that the award of attorney fees was necessary for
Lauren's support. 2' Kenneth argued that the decision of whether the
award was actually support should be made by the bankruptcy court and
that the bankruptcy court should consider the former spouse's financial
status in making that decision. 214 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
stating that expanding the discharge provision of section 523(a)(5) "'into
an assessment of the ongoing financial circumstances'" of a former
spouse "would of necessity embroil federal courts in domestic relations

204. 90 F.3d 444 (11th Cir. 1996).
205. 90 F.3d at 446.
206. Id.
207. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994) (debt to a former spouse is not discharged
in bankruptcy to the extent that "such debt ... is actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support")).
208. Id. See In re Strickland, 160 B.R. 675 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
209. 90 F.3d at 446.
210. Id. (citing Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 904-05 (11th Cir. 1985)).
211. Id. (citing Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), 9 F.3d 878, 880 (10th Cir. 1993)).
212. Id. at 446-47 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.16(1) (1993)).
213. Id. at 447.
214. Id. (citing Adams v. Zentz, 963 F.2d 197, 200 (8th Cir. 1992)). The court in
Strickland refused to follow this reasoning, noting that section 523(a)(5) "requires noting
more than 'a simple inquiry as to whether the obligation can legitimately be characterized
as support.'" 90 F.3d at 447 (quoting Harrell, 754 F.2d at 906).
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matters which should properly be reserved to the state courts."'" For
these reasons, the court in Strickland concluded that the debt was
excepted from the debtor's discharge.""6
X.

SECURITY INTEREST IN POSTPETITION HOTEL REVENUE

The debtor in FinancialSecurity Assurance, Inc. v. Toliman-Hundley
Dalton, L.P.2 7 owned a hotel. The case involved a security agreement
by which the debtor, Tollman-Hundley, granted the creditor, Financial
Security, a security interest in its hotel and all rents and profits
associated therewith. After default, Financial Security accelerated the
payments due under the loan, and Tollman-Hundley filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. Tollman-Hundley operated the hotel postpetition
for thirteen months until Financial Security obtained relief from the
automatic stay to foreclose. During that time, the hotel generated more
than $4,000,000 in revenues, but after paying postpetition operating
expenses, only $400,000 remained. Financial Security attempted to gain
access to the funds, arguing that they were covered by the parties'
security agreement. Tollman-Hundley sought an order authorizing it to
use the excess money to fund a liquidation plan,"' thus setting up the
dispute to be settled by the courts.
According to section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, property generally
acquired postpetition by the debtor is not subject to a prepetition
security interest.2 19 Nevertheless, exceptions exist in section 552(b):
A security interest will remain in postpetition "proceeds, product,
offspring, rents, or profits"' derived from prepetition property "to the
extent provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law."
In addressing the contentions of the parties, the
bankruptcy court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Butner v.
United States222 and concluded that state law defined the terms
"proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits.' 2m The bankruptcy
court then reviewed Georgia law and determined that hotel revenues did
not fall within these definitions. 224 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court
215. 90 F.3d at 447 (quoting Harrell, 754 F.2d at 907).
216.

Id.

217. 74 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
218. Id. at 1121-22.
219. Id. at 1122 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994)).
220. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 552(bXl)).
221. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
222. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
223. Id. at 54.
224. 74 F.3d at 1122 (citing In re Tollman-Hundley Dalton, L.P., 162 B.R. 26, 29
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993), affld sub noa. Financial Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Tollman-Hundley
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concluded that the excess $400,000 was not covered by section 552(b),
and the district court affirmed.2
Undeterred, Financial Security appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and
succeeded in obtaining a reversal. 22
The Eleventh Circuit first
concluded that the lower courts had erred in using state law to define
the terms "proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits."227 The court
found that the lower courts' reliance on Butner was misplaced in that
Butner authorized reference to state law to determine only whether
Financial Security's security interest extended to hotel revenues.2s
However, the question presented by the case was not whether the hotel
revenues were covered by the security interest because the parties
already had agreed that they were.'
Instead, the question was
whether hotel revenues fell within the meaning of section 552(b). 3 0
According to the Eleventh Circuit, this issue was simply a matter of
interpreting the meaning of a federal statute.23 1 Quite interestingly,
the ultimate source for interpreting federal law in this case was Black's
Law Dictionary,which defines the term "rent" as "consideration paid for
use or occupation of property" and "in a broader sense,.., the compensation or fee paid, usually periodically, for the use of any rental
property, land, buildings, equipment, etc."232 Virtually adopting
Black's Law Dictionary as defining rent as used in section 552(b), the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the hotel revenues at issue came within
the scope of that section. 23 Thus, Financial Security retained its
security interest in the postpetition hotel revenues generated by
Tollman-Hundley.
The Eleventh Circuit sought to bolster its ruling by pointing out that
the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code changed section 552(b)
to explicitly include hotel revenues within its scope.2 ' Nevertheless,
it is interesting to note that the Eleventh Circuit's decision was contrary
to the decisions of other circuits that had held that state law was

Dalton, L.P., 165 B.R. 698 (N.D. Ga. 1994)).
225. Id. (citing FinancialSec. Assurance, 165 B.R. at 702).
226. Id. at 1125.
227. Id. at 1123.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1123-24.
231. Id. at 1124.
232. Id. (quotingBLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (6th ed. 1990)).
233. 1&
234. 74 F.3d at 1124-25 (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994)).
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determinative of the meaning of pre-1994 section 552(b).'
Because
section 552(b) has been amended, however, such a conflict should not be
significant for future cases.
XI.

TRUSTEE AND PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION

The Eleventh Circuit in United States Trustee v. Fishback (In re
Glados, Inc.) 2 6 limited the rights of trustees and professionals to
obtain interest on their fee awards. 7 Lawrence Kleinfeld was appointed Chapter 7 trustee for the debtor, Glados, Inc., in 1985. The only
assets available in the case were two causes of action, and the trustee
employed the law firm of Kleinfeld & Fishback as trustee's counsel to
assist him in pursuing these claims. After several years of litigation, the
trustee succeeded in obtaining proceeds for the bankruptcy estate
sufficient to pay in full all creditors with a surplus remaining."M
When the trustee and trustee's counsel filed their fee applications, they
requested interest on their fee claims under section 726(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes interest on claims when a surplus
exists."' Over the objection of the United States Trustee, the bankruptcy court awarded interest on the fees.'
The Eleventh Circuit framed the issues as (1) whether, under section
726(a)(5), the trustee may receive interest from the date of his appointment and (2) whether a professional, such as counsel for the trustee,
may receive interest from the date of the fee application. 1 The
statutory provisions involved, however, created a dilemma. Specifically,
section 726(a)(5) provides that interest on the claim is to be paid "at the
legal rate from the date of the filing of the petition.' 2 Although
professional fees are paid in accordance with section 726, these fees are
awarded under section 330 during the bankruptcy case.'
In other
words, even though interest is to accrue on a claim from the date of the
petition, a claim for fees does not exist until the fee award, which is

235. Id, at 1124 n.9 (citing Financial Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Days Cal. Riverside Ltd.
Partnership, 27 F.3d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1994); T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership v.
Financial Sec. Assurance, Inc., 10 F.3d 1099, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1833 (1994)).
236. 83 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 1996).
237. See id. at 1366.
238. Id. at 1361.
239. Id. at 1362; see also 11 U.S.C. § 726(aX5) (1994).
240. 83 F.3d at 1362.
241. Id.
242. Id at 1363 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5)).
243. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1994) (setting forth the standard and procedure for
compensating officers of the estate)).
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normally at or near the end of the case. 2" Noting that under the
statutory provisions on compensation a trustee or professional does not
have a claim until the fee is awarded, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the time for the interest to begin accruing was the date of the
actual fee award."'
XII.

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES AND CHAPTER 13 CASES

A debtor's attempt to cure a mortgage default through a Chapter 13
plan after foreclosure was the issue before the Eleventh Circuit in
Commercial Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Smith (In re Smith).'
Commercial Federal, the mortgage holder on the debtor's residence,
conducted a valid foreclosure sale and purchased the property after
Smith defaulted on the mortgage. Less than three months later, Smith
filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. In his Chapter 13 plan, Smith
proposed to reinstate the mortgage by paying prepetition arrearage
through the plan and remaining current on the monthly mortgage
payments to Commercial Federal. 47 He argued that under Alabama

law, he had the right to redeem the mortgage for one year after
foreclosure by paying a one-time lump sum for the full amount due and
that this right could be modified by allowing him to cure the default
through his plan.2'
The Eleventh Circuit framed the issue as "whether 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)
permits a debtor to exercise his state statutory right of redemption in a
Chapter 13 plan by 'curing' a default and 'reinstating' a mortgage after
a valid foreclosure sale of his property. 49 Under section 1322(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may not modify the rights of a mortgage
holder through a Chapter 13 plan.' Smith argued that this provision
did not prevent him from modifying his statutory right of redemption."' The Eleventh Circuit, however, disagreed and concluded that
even though this redemption right became property of the bankruptcy
estate,252 Smith could only exercise that right by making the one-time

244. Id. at 1363-64. It appears that by awarding the interest from the date of
appointment or the date of the fee application, the bankruptcy and district courts were
trying to reach a compromise solution. Id. at 1364 n.3.
245. Id. at 1365-66; see also Boldt v. Crake (In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co.), 945 F.2d
320 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Brown, 190 B.R. 689 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
246. 85 F.3d 1555 (11th Cir. 1996).
247. Id. at 1555.
248. Id. (citing AIA. CODE § 6-5-251 (1993)).
249. I& (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1994)).
250, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX2).
251. 85 F.3d at 1558.
252. Id.
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payment as required by the statute.2" Significantly, Smith filed for
bankruptcy protection after the valid foreclosure by Commercial Federal,
and the event "drew a bright-line termination date of the right to cure
Thus, Smith's statutory right
a default through a Chapter 13 plan. '
of redemption could not be modified by his Chapter 13 plan to allow him
to cure the default on his mortgage." s
XIII.

RULES OF PROCEDURE

Failureto State a Claim
In Brandt v. First Union Corp. (In re Southeast Banking Corp.),'
the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a Chapter 7 trustee's complaint for
failure to state a claim in accordance with rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 The debtor in this case was a holding
company that owned all the shares of Southeast Bank in Florida. Prior
to bankruptcy, the debtor and First Union entered into an agreement to
discuss the possibility of a merger. Under the agreement, First Union
had access to confidential information regarding the debtor's financial
condition. Sometime thereafter, state and federal regulators closed the
debtor's bank, and First Union bought its assets through an auction.
The trustee then commenced a civil action against First Union, claiming
that First Union leaked its financial information to the regulators, thus
resulting in the bank's closure. The trustee also claimed that at that
time the bank actually was solvent and otherwise financially sound. 2s
The district court dismissed the trustee's complaint for failure to state
a claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.' 9
In affirming, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the basic claim of the
trustee was that the bank "was liquid and should not have been
closed."
The decision to close the bank was made by federal
regulators, but the regulators were not subject to suit for taking such a
discretionary action. 2"' The Eleventh Circuit stated that the trustee's
claim against First Union was merely an attempt to "do what it
A.

253. Id. at 1560-61.
254. Id. at 1560 (citing Federal Land Bank v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1435
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985)).
255. Id. at 1561.
256. 93 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
257. FED. R. CrV. P. 12(b)6).
258. 93 F.3d at 751.
259. Id. at 751-52.
260. Id. at 751.
261. Id.
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otherwise could not do, sue for its damages as a result of the government's alleged improper closure of Southeast Bank." 2 Because the
trustee's complaint was based on a discretionary act of federal regulators, it failed to state a claim for relief.'
B. 21mely Appeal
A Chapter 7 trustee found himself the victim of his own procedural
error in Floridav. Brandt (In re Southeast Bank Corp.).2" The trustee
sought a determination that certain taxes on the debtor's art collection
were invalid.'
The bankruptcy court ruled that the taxes were valid
and entered an order in favor of the taxing authority on October 1,
1993.2" Three days later, on October 4, the bankruptcy court entered
a memorandum opinion explaining the reasons for the order.8 7 The
trustee filed a motion for reconsideration on October 13, which was nine
days after the memorandum opinion but twelve days after the entry of
the actual order.2" The bankruptcy court subsequently granted the
motion and entered a judgment concluding that the taxes were invalid,
and the district court affirmed.'
On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversedY
According to
rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the trustee had ten
days from the date of the bankruptcy court's order to file his motion for
reconsideration.2 71 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the original
bankruptcy court order was entered on October 1, 1993 and that the
trustee's motion was filed on October 13, twelve days later. 2 Because
the motion was filed outside the ten day period required under rule

262. Id. at 751-52.
263. Id. at 752.
264. 97 F.3d 476 (11th Cir. 1996).
265. Id. at 477.
266. Id. at 477-78.
267. Id. at 478.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 479.
271. Id at 478 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) which provides that "[a]ny motion to alter
or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Id.
(made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9023)).
272. Id. at 478. The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that under FED. R. Cr. P. 58,
applicable to bankruptcy proceedings under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9021, the "brightline
definition" for the entry of a judgment is the entry of a document separate from a
memorandum opinion that sets forth the judgment. Id Thus, the applicable date was the
date of the entry of the order and not the date of the entry of the memorandum opinion.
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59(e), the motion was untimely,
and the bankruptcy court lacked
78
jurisdiction to consider it."
XIV

NONBANKRUPrCY LAW

A.

Rate UnderchargeClaims
The trustee's ability to bring certain rate undercharge claims was
presented to the Eleventh Circuit in Whitaker v. Frito-Lay, Inc. (In re
Olympia Holding Corp.).2 74 The trustee for a bankrupt motor common
carrier brought an undercharge claim against Frito-Lay, a shipper,
claiming that the debtor's tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("I.C.C.") were invalid because they identified the shipper
by code instead of by name. 275 The trustee sought to have the coded
rates declared void ab initio26 and collect from the shipper the difference between the discounted rate actually charged and the official class
rate on file with the I.C.C.27 7 The Eleventh Circuit noted, however,
that under the Negotiated Rates Act of 1993,278 Congress specifically
validated the use of coded rates. 279 Thus, contrary to the trustee's
The court then concluded
contention, the coded tariffs were legal.'
that it did not have the authority to retroactively reject a tariff because
Congress only delegated such authority to the I.C.C." 1 The trustee's
claim was therefore dismissed.8 2
B.

State Law Issues

The res judicata effect of a foreclosure proceeding under Florida law
on the value of collateral was at issue in Ob /Gyn Solutions, L.C. v. Six

273. Id.
274. 88 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 1996).
275. 88 F.3d at 954-55.
276. Id. at 958.
277. Id. at 954.
278. Pub. L. No. 103-108, 107 Stat. 2044 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.). Congress enacted the Negotiated Rates Act of 1993 primarily in an
attempt to stem the flood of rate undercharge claims brought in bankruptcy by trustee's
for debtor motor common carriers.
279. 88 F.3d at 959-60.
280. Id. at 962.
281. Id. (citing I.C.C. v. American Trucking Ass'n, 467 U.S. 354,367 (1984)). The court
further noted that the I.C.C.'s ability to reject a tariff was extremely limited and could not
be done in this case in view of Congress's clear expression of support for the coded tariffs.
Id.
282. Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1452

[Vol. 48

(In re Six).' In this case, the debtor guaranteed a note secured by a
mortgage. After default, the creditor obtained a final judgment of
foreclosure determining the lien to be in the amount of $1,838,196.02
and then bid on the property for $1,200,000 at the judicial sale. The
creditor later obtained a money judgment against the debtor in the full
amount of the lien. The judgment, which the debtor did not challenge,
failed to reflect the offset for the judicial sale or fair market value of the
property. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the creditor filed a proof
of claim reflecting the amount of the money judgment with an offset for
the amount bid at the judicial sale. The debtor objected to the proof of
claim.'
After the bankruptcy and district courts sustained the debtor's
objection,28 the creditor appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.2" The
issue on appeal was whether the principle of res judicata under Florida
law prevented the debtor from challenging the claim that was based on
a final state court judgment. 87 The Eleventh Circuit, affirming the
lower courts, noted that because the creditor included a "previously
unadjudicated offset" in its claim, the creditor put in issue before the
bankruptcy court the amount of the claim and the valuation of the
property that was the basis for the claim. 2

In other words, the

creditor's proof of claim admitted that the state court judgment did not
reflect the actual value of the claim.8 9 Furthermore, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that under Florida law a rebuttable presumption is created
that the foreclosure bid price is equal to the property's fair market
value.'
The lower courts had found that the property that the
creditor obtained through foreclosure was worth approximately
$1,900,000.29 Because this value exceeded the amount of the state
court judgment, the debtor's debt was extinguished by the foreclosure,
resulting in the creditor's claim being disallowed.2s
In Dayton Securities Associates v. Securities Group 1980 (In re

Securities Group 1980), limited partners of the debtor found themselves obligated under New York law to make significant capital

283.

80 F.3d 452 (11th Cir. 1996).

284.

Id. at 454.

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 454-54.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 456.

Id.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 457.
74 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1996).
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contributions to the trustee in bankruptcy even though they were no
When the
longer limited partners at the time of the bankruptcy.'
parties became limited partners,, they agreed to make additional capital
contributions to the limited partnership, an obligation which, if
necessary, required them to personally and severally contribute an
amount up to three times their initial capital contribution. At some
point, the limited partners were bought out, and a few years later, the
limited partnership filed for bankruptcy. Thereafter, the trustee
demanded that all former limited partners make the additional capital
contribution so that the debtor could pay off all creditors, but the former
limited partners objected." 5 The certificates of the limited partners
were part of the public record in New York, and the certificates noted
the obligation of the limited partners to make the additional capital
contribution, if necessary.2
The Eleventh Circuit noted that under New York law, a limited
partner is liable to the partnership for any unpaid contributions he has
Furthermore, New York law has
agreed on the certificate to make.'
a strong policy favoring the protection of creditors who extend credit to
partnerships in view of a limited partner's promise of capital contributions.2
Therefore, the limited partners were liable for the capital
contribution, at least with respect to the creditors who extended credit
or whose claims arose before the limited partners left.o
In Lummus Corp. v. Unsecured Creditor's Committee of Lummus
Industries, Inc. (In re Lummus Development Corp.)," two creditors
filed proofs of claim contending that they were entitled to the notes
receivable of the debtor,"' The crux of the dispute was whether an
asset purchase agreement between the two creditors conveyed the notes
receivable from the one creditor, Lummus Industries,"'2 to the other
The Eleventh Circuit found that the
creditor, Lummus Corporation.'
unambiguous language of the asset purchase agreement did not indicate

294. Id. at 1108.

295. Id at 1105-06.
296. Id. at 1107-08.

297. Id. at 1108 (citing N.Y. PARTNRSHIP LAW § 106(l)(b) (McKinney 1988)).
298. Id. (citing N.Y. PARTNERSMP LAW § 106(3)).
299. Id. This liability extended to two lease claims that arose after the limited
partners withdrew from the partnership. The basis for their liability was the fact that the
leases were entered into prior to their withdrawal. As such, the landlords relied on the
publicly recorded certificates when they extended credit to the partnership. Id. at 1109-12.
300. 85 F.3d 575 (11th Cir. 1996).
301. Id. at 576.
302. Id. Lummus Industries was the debtor's parent corporation. Id.
303. Id.
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that the notes receivable were being conveyed to Lummus Corporation.s Lummus Corporation, on the other hand, contended that the
omission of the notes receivable was a mutual mistake. 5 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit noted that under Georgia law, "if the
agreement contains unambiguous language, the court gives the language
its plain meaning."" 6 Thus, in view of the agreement's plain language,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decisions of the lower courts that
Lummus Industries, not Lummus Corporation, was entitled to the notes
receivable. "

304. Id. at 577. The value of this asset amounted to over $4.6 million. Id.
305. Id. at 576.
306. Id. at 577 (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam, 959 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir.
1992) (citing Hunsinger v. Lockheed Corp., 192 Ga. App. 781, 386 S.E.2d 537 (1989))).
307. Id.

